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Requirements for Secure Clock Synchronization
Lakshay Narula, Student Member, IEEE, and Todd E. Humphreys, Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper establishes a fundamental theory of
secure clock synchronization. Accurate clock synchronization is
the backbone of systems managing power distribution, financial
transactions, telecommunication operations, database services,
etc. Some clock synchronization (time transfer) systems, such
as the Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), are based
on one-way communication from a master to a slave clock.
Others, such as the Network Transport Protocol (NTP), and
the IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol (PTP), involve two-way
communication between the master and slave. This paper shows
that all one-way time transfer protocols are vulnerable to replay
attacks that can potentially compromise timing information.
A set of conditions for secure two-way clock synchronization
is proposed and proved to be necessary and sufficient. It is
shown that IEEE 1588 PTP, although a two-way synchronization
protocol, is not compliant with these conditions, and is therefore
insecure. Requirements for secure IEEE 1588 PTP are proposed,
and a second example protocol is offered to illustrate the range
of compliant systems.
Index Terms—time transfer; clock synchronization; security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure clock synchronization is critical to a host of tech-
nologies and infrastructure today. The phasor measurement
units (PMUs) that enable monitoring and control in power
grids need timing information to synchronize measurements
across a wide geographical area [1]. Wireless communication
networks synchronize their base stations to enable call handoff
[2]. Financial networks transfer time across the globe to ensure
a common time for pricing and transaction time-stamping
[3]. Cloud database services such as Google’s Cloud Spanner
similarly require precise synchronization between the data
centers to maintain consistency [4]. These clock synchroniza-
tion applications have sub-millisecond accuracy and stringent
security requirements.
Clock synchronization is performed either by over-the-wire
packet-based communication (NTP, PTP, etc.), or by over-the-
air radio signals (GNSS [2], cellular signals, LORAN [5],
DCF77 [6], etc.); both wired and wireless clock synchroniza-
tion are used extensively. Synchronization by GNSS is the
method of choice in systems with the most stringent accuracy
requirements. Equipped with atomic clocks synchronized to
the most accurate time standards available, GNSS satellites
can synchronize any number of stations on Earth to within a
few tens of nanoseconds [7]. NTP is usually only accurate to
a few milliseconds, but essentially comes for free whenever
the host device is connected to a network.
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One-way clock synchronization protocols are based on
unidirectional communication from the time master station, A,
to the slave station, B. In such protocols, A acts as a broadcast
station and may send out timing signals either continuously
or periodically. The principal drawback of one-way wireless
clock synchronization protocols is their vulnerability to delay
attacks in which a man-in-the-middle (MITM) adversary nefar-
iously delays or repeats a valid transmission from one station
to another. Cryptographic and other measures can improve the
security of one-way protocols against delay and other signal-
and data-level spoofing attacks [8]–[10], but, as will be shown,
such protocols remain fundamentally insecure because of their
inability to measure round trip time. They can be secured
against unsophisticated attacks, but remain vulnerable to more
powerful adversaries.
Two-way clock synchronization protocols involve bi-
directional communication between stations A and B. Such
protocols enable measurement of the round trip time of the
timing signal, which is shown to be necessary for detecting
MITM delay attacks. This measurement, however, is not by
itself sufficient for provable security against such attacks.
This paper establishes a fundamental theory of secure clock
synchronization. In contrast to the current literature on timing
security [11]–[17], the problem is formalized with definitions,
explicit assumptions, and proofs. The major contributions of
this work are as follows:
1) One-way synchronization protocols are shown to be in-
secure against a MITM delay attack. Adversarial delay is
shown to be indistinguishable from clock bias, and hence
is unobservable without further assumptions.
2) A set of necessary conditions for secure two-way
clock synchronization is presented and proved. Similar
protocol-specific conditions have been previously pro-
posed [11], [13], [18], but have not been generalized to
apply to a universal clock synchronization model.
3) The proposed necessary conditions, with stricter upper
bounds, are shown to be sufficient for secure synchroniza-
tion in presence of a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversary. Provable security for clock synchronization has
not previously been explored in the literature.
4) The two-way synchronization scheme of IEEE 1588 PTP
is shown to violate a necessary condition for security.
This is a known vulnerability of PTP for which a fix
has been proposed [11]. Having established a theory for
security, this paper is able to show that the proposed fix is
sufficient but is not the minimal necessary modification.
A more parsimonious security requirement for PTP is
presented that is both necessary and sufficient for secure
synchronization.
5) A generic construction of a secure two-way clock syn-
chronization protocol is presented to illustrate the general
applicability of the proposed necessary and sufficient
conditions to a range of underlying protocols.
This paper is a significant extension of [19], by the same
authors: (1) the necessary conditions for security have been
revamped to incorporate both continuous and packet-based
clock synchronization systems, (2) a sufficiency proof for the
security conditions has been formulated, and (3) protocol-
specific countermeasures presented in the literature have been
unified with the proposed conditions.
Wired clock synchronization is inherently more secure than
its wireless counterpart because physical access to cables is
easier controlled than access to radio channels. This paper
primarily focuses on the more challenging task of clock
synchronization over a wireless channel; nonetheless, the
attacks and security protocols discussed herein also apply to
wireline clock synchronization protocols in the case where
the adversary gets access to the channel. For example, if an
adversary is able to hijack a boundary clock in a wireline PTP
network, then the resulting vulnerabilities are equivalent to
that of wireless synchronization where the adversary has open
access to the radio channel. In fact, an adversarial boundary
clock is even more potent than a wireless adversary since it
can completely block the authentic signal from reaching B.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Previous
works on secure clock synchronization, and their relation to
this paper, are summarized in Section II. Section III presents
a generic model for clock synchronization and shows that
all possible one-way synchronization protocols are insecure.
Section IV presents the set of security conditions for a wireless
clock synchronization protocol, proving these to be necessary
by contradiction. Section V presents a proof of sufficiency
for the same set of conditions with stricter upper bounds. A
construction of an example secure protocol is presented in
Section VI, along with the security requirements for IEEE
1588 PTP. Section VII presents a simulation study of a
secure clock synchronization model operating over a simplistic
channel model. Concluding remarks are made in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
GNSS, NTP, and PTP are the most widely used protocols
for clock synchronization. A number of research efforts have
been made to assess and improve the security of these proto-
cols. This section reviews some of the notable efforts in the
literature.
The GNSS jamming and spoofing threat has been recog-
nized in the literature for more than a decade. A survey
of the current state-of-the-art in spoofing and anti-spoofing
techniques is presented in [8]. Recent works on GNSS anti-
spoofing techniques have specifically focused on the case of
timing security. Collaborative multi-receiver [16] and direct
time estimation [17] techniques have been proposed for robust
GNSS clock synchronization.
The growing popularity of IEEE 1588 PTP for synchro-
nization in critical infrastructure has brought about concerns
regarding its security [11]–[15]. The threats to IEEE 1588
PTP can broadly be categorized into data-level attacks (such
as modification of time messages) and physical layer at-
tacks (such as replay and delay attacks). While cryptographic
protocols are able to foil data-level attacks against realistic
adversaries, some signal-level attacks, such as the delay attack,
remain open vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, their execution is
relatively simple. Signal-level attacks, such as the man-in-the-
middle attack, have been studied in the recent past. However,
these studies only include a brief discussion on countermea-
sure techniques, and no proof or theoretical guarantee of the
efficacy of the countermeasures has been provided.
Ullman et al. [11] propose measuring the propagation delays
during initialization of clock synchronization and monitoring
the propagation delays during the normal operation of the time
synchronization protocol. However, [11] does not prove that
such a defense would be sufficient to prevent the delay attacks.
In [13], it is remarked that the clock offset computed
between multiple master clocks over a symmetric channel must
be zero, and thus, if multiple master clocks are available, they
can detect any malicious delay introduced by an adversary.
However, this defense does not consider the possibility that
the adversary may only delay the packets sent to the slave
nodes.
The work presented in [18] is perhaps in closest relation
to the current paper. Annessi et al. upper bound the clock
drift between subsequent synchronization signals using a drift
model, and perform two-way exchange of timestamps such
that the master clock is able to verify the time at the slave.
Furthermore, given the maximum clock drift rate and the
maximum and minimum propagation delay of the timing
signal, they derive an upper bound on the adversarial delay
that can go unnoticed. However, with conservative bounds on
the maximum clock drift rate and the variation in path delays,
the accuracy guarantees derived in [18] may be insufficient for
certain applications. Moreover, as will be shown in this paper,
they fail to take account of one the necessary conditions for
secure synchronization.
This paper abstracts the clock synchronization model and
assesses its security in a generic setting. It is shown that
specialization of the generic security conditions to the par-
ticular protocols assessed in the aforementioned efforts leads
to solutions similar or identical to those previously advanced.
Thus, establishing the fundamental theory of secure clock
synchronization also serves to unify the prior work in the
literature.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A general system model for clock synchronization is shown
in Fig. 1. The time seeker station, B, wishes to synchronize
its clock to that of the time master station, A. For wireless
synchronization applications, stations A and B are assumed to
have known locations, xA and xB, respectively. Due to clock
imperfections, the time at station B, tB, continuously drifts with
respect to tA, the time at station A. Station B seeks to track the
relative drift of its clock by an exchange of signals between
A and B. Without loss of generality, this paper assumes tA is
equivalent to true time (relative to some reference epoch), a
close proxy for which is GPS system time.
It is assumed that A and B are able to exchange crypto-
graphic keys securely, if required. This exchange may occur
TABLE I
NOTATION USED IN THIS PAPER
A Time master station
B Time seeker station
t
mi
m Transmit time, according to m, of its ith signal feature
t
mi
n Receipt time, according to n, of the ith signal feature trans-
mitted by m
τ i
mn
Delay, in true time, experienced by the ith feature in propa-
gating from m to n
τ i
mnM
Component of τ i
mn
introduced by the man-in-the-middle ad-
versary
τ i
mnN
Component of τ i
mn
due to natural factors, including process-
ing, transmission, and propagation delay
τ¯ i
mn
Modeled or a priori estimate of τ i
mnN
τ˜ i
mnN
τ i
mnN
− τ¯ i
mn
τBB Delay, in true time, between the receipt of sync and transmis-
sion of response at B
τ¯BB Delay, according to B, between the receipt of sync and
transmission of response at B
τ˜BB τBB − τ¯BB
∆ti
AB
Clock offset between A and B at the time of receipt of the
ith feature at B
∆tˆi
AB
B’s best estimate of ∆ti
AB
wi
mn
Measurement noise associated with the measured time-of-
arrival of the ith signal feature from m at n
τ
ij
RTT
Round trip time, in true time, involving the ith and jth signal
features of A and B, respectively
τ¯
ij
RTT
Modeled or a priori estimate of τ
ij
RTT
z
ij
RTT
A noisy measurement of τ
ij
RTT
over a public channel via a protocol such as the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange [20] or via quantum key exchange techniques
[21], [22]. Alternatively, symmetric keys for neighboring sta-
tions may be loaded at the time of installation.
Fig. 1. Abstract model of a clock synchronization system with a time master
station A and a time seeker station B. The antenna outputs are driven by the
clock through the receiver and transmitter blocks.
Station A sends out a sync signal, sA, having distinct features
which can be disambiguated from one another by observing a
window of the signal containing the feature. The transition in
sA marking the beginning of a data packet is an example of
such a signal feature. Furthermore, the system at A is designed
such that the kth feature is transmitted at time tAk
A
. B either
knows tAk
A
by prior arrangement, or a digital representation of
tAk
A
is encoded in sA (e.g., a timestamp). In any case, B knows
when the kth feature was sent, according to A’s clock. This
sets up a bijection
Sk
A
⇋ k⇋ tAk
A
(1)
where Sk
A
represents a window of sA containing the kth feature.
Station B’s received sync signal, denoted rB, is a delayed
and noisy replica of sA. Let τ
k
AB
denote the delay (in true
time) experienced by the kth feature of sA as it travels from A
to B. For line-of-sight (LOS) wireless communication, τk
AB
is
the sum of the free-space propagation delay over the distance
‖xB − xA‖ and additional delays due to interaction of the
timing signal with the intervening channel.
A. One-Way Clock Synchronization Model
In one-way clock synchronization, the exchange of signals
between A and B terminates with reception of the sync signal
at B. Let tAk
B
denote the time according to B at which the
kth feature of sA is received at B. The window captured by
B containing the kth feature of sA, denoted R
k
B
, enables B to
measure tAk
B
to within a small error caused by measurement
noise. This error, wk
AB
, is modeled as zero-mean with variance
σ2ǫ . The measurement itself, denoted z
k
B
, is modeled as
zk
B
= tAk
B
+ wk
AB
= tAk
A
+ τk
AB
−∆tk
AB
+ wk
AB
(2)
where
∆tk
AB
≡ tAk
A
+ τk
AB
− tAk
B
(3)
is the unknown time offset B wishes to estimate. As the
bijection in (1) is known to B, B can obtain tAk
A
for the kth
detected feature. If a prior estimate τ¯k
AB
of the delay τk
AB
is
available to B, then the desired time offset can be estimated
as
∆tˆk
AB
= tAk
A
+ τ¯k
AB
− zk
B
(4)
As a concrete example, consider the case of clock synchro-
nization via GNSS in which B is a GNSS receiver in a known
fixed location xB, and A is a GNSS satellite whose location is
known to vary with time as xA(tA). On detection of the kth
feature in a window of captured data, B determines tAk
A
using
(1) and also makes the measurement
zk
B
= tAk
A
+ τk
AB
−∆tk
AB
+ wk
AB
= tAk
A
+
[
‖xB − xA(t
Ak
A
)‖+Dkρ
c
]
−∆tk
AB
+ wk
AB
where Dkρ is the sum of excess ionospheric and neutral-
atmospheric delays (in distance units) and c is the speed of
light.
The known receiver and satellite positions can be invoked
to model the signal’s propagation delay as
τ¯k
AB
=
‖xB − xA(t
Ak
A
)‖+ D¯kρ
c
where D¯kρ is a model of the excess delay D
k
ρ at the time of
receipt of the kth feature at B. The modeled excess delay
is based on atmospheric models possibly refined by dual-
frequency measurements [23]. An estimate of the time offset,
∆tˆk
AB
, can then be made using tAk
A
, zk
B
, and τ¯k
AB
in (4).
It must be noted that, for one-way clock synchronization,
any errors in the estimate of the distance between A and B,
and in the estimate of the excess channel delay, will appear
as an error in the estimate of the time offset.
B. Two-Way Clock Synchronization Model
As discussed above, if an estimate of τ¯k
AB
is available, then
clock synchronization is complete after B receives the sync
signal rB. The response signal from B in a two-way protocol is
typically used to either determine, or refine, the estimate of τ¯k
AB
with a measurement of the round trip time (RTT). The ability
to measure RTT obviates the requirement that ‖xB − xA‖
be known a priori. In IEEE 1588 PTP, for example, RTT is
measured to initially obtain, and periodically refine, the value
of τ¯k
AB
used in deriving ∆tˆk
AB
from (4).
In the system model considered in this paper, station B
transmits a response sB that is designed such that (1) there is a
one-to-one mapping l(k) between the lth feature in sB and the
kth feature in sA, and (2) the lth feature’s index can be inferred
by observation of a window containing it. Symbolically, if Sl
B
is a window of sB containing the lth feature of the response
signal, then
Sl
B
⇋ l(k)⇋ k (5)
On receipt of the kth feature in sA, at time t
Ak
B
by B’s clock,
but at zk
B
as measured by B, B transmits the lth feature in sB
after a short delay, τBB (in true time), hereon referred to as the
layover time.
The layover time is introduced as a practical consideration.
On receipt of A’s kth feature, B is physically unable to transmit
its own lth feature with zero delay. Thus, B is allowed to
specify a short layover time, τ¯BB, after which it intends to
launch its lth feature. It is important to note that the actual
layover time, τBB, will not be the same as the intended layover
time due to (1) non-zero measurement noise wk
AB
and (2) non-
zero frequency offset of the clock at B with respect to true
time. However, if the layover time is sufficiently short and
the measurement noise is benign, the difference τ¯BB − τBB
can be made negligible compared to the time synchronization
requirement, with the actual value depending on the quality of
B’s clock.
Station A receives the response signal as a delayed and noisy
replica of sB, denoted rA. The delay experienced by the lth
feature as it travels from B to A, in true time, is denoted τ l
BA
.
Station A captures a windowRl
A
of rA that enables A to identify
the lth feature in sB according to (5), and to infer that the
received feature is in response to the kth feature transmitted
by A. Furthermore, A makes a noise-corrupted measurement
zl
A
of the time-of-arrival of the lth feature in sB, according to
A’s clock. The noise, denoted wl
BA
, is again modeled as zero-
mean with variance σ2ǫ . The full measurement model is given
by
zl
A
= tBl
A
+ wl
BA
= tAk
A
+ τk
AB
+ τBB + τ
l
BA
+ wl
BA
Since tAk
A
is exactly known at A, a direct noisy measurement
of the round trip time τk
AB
+ τBB + τ
l
BA
can be made as
zklRTT ≡ z
l
A
− tAk
A
(6)
Note that the noise wl
BA
and wk
AB
in zkl
RTT
is embedded within
zl
A
and τBB, respectively. Under the assumption of symmetric
delays, i.e., τk
AB
= τ l
BA
, and with knowledge of τ¯BB, the
measured RTT in (6) can be exploited to improve the modeled
propagation delay for future exchanges between A and B:
τ¯m
AB
= τ¯n
BA
=
zkl
RTT
− τ¯BB
2
where m > k and n > l.
The two-way exchange of sync and response messages is
summarized visually in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Two-way exchange of sync and response messages between A and B
in the absence of a man-in-the-middle adversary.
Since RTT will play a central role in the discussion on
secure synchronization later on, various definitions and as-
sumptions concerning RTT are stated here for clarity:
• RTT for the kth feature in sA and the corresponding lth
feature in sB is defined as
τkl
RTT
≡ τk
AB
+ τBB + τ
l
BA
• Measured RTT includes, in addition to RTT, measurement
noise at A; it is modeled as
zkl
RTT
= τk
AB
+ τBB + τ
l
BA
+ wl
BA
• Modeled RTT, also called the prior estimate of RTT, is
defined as
τ¯kl
RTT
≡ τ¯k
AB
+ τ¯BB + τ¯
l
BA
(7)
For example, in the case of wireless clock synchroniza-
tion with LOS electromagnetic signals, a prior estimate
of RTT is based on the distance between A and B and
on models of channel delays in excess of free-space
propagation between these.
• The modeled RTT, τ¯kl
RTT
, can be refined with measure-
ments of RTT in a two-way protocol. Alternatively, as
will be discussed later, if an accurate modeled RTT is
available, it and the measured RTT can be used to detect
delay attacks.
• Unambiguous measurement of RTT requires that there
exist a one-to-one mapping between the signal features
in sA and sB, as mathematically represented in (5). On
detection of the lth feature in sB, A must be able to deduce
that this feature was transmitted approximately τ¯BB after
B received the kth feature in sA. This requirement is
appropriately a part of the RTT definition since it enables
A to unambiguously measure RTT.
C. Attack Model
The attack model in this paper considers a MITM adver-
sary M. The available computational resources allow M to
execute probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms. M
can receive, detect, and replay signals from A and B with
arbitrarily precise directional antennas. Additionally, M has
precise knowledge of xA and xB, and can take up any position
around or between the two stations. It has unrestricted access
to the signals that A and B exchange over the air, and has
complete knowledge of their synchronization protocol save for
the cryptographic keys.
Let L denote the alert limit, defined as the error in time
synchronization not to be exceeded without issuing an alert.
Definition III.1. Clock synchronization is defined to be com-
promised if |∆tAB −∆tˆAB| ≥ L.
Note that, in the absence of an adversary, clock synchro-
nization is not compromised so long as
|τk
AB
− τ¯k
AB
+ wk
AB
| < L
However, in the presence of a MITM adversary, the sync signal
is delayed or advanced such that
τk
AB
= τk
ABN
+ τk
ABM
(8)
where τk
ABN
> 0 is the natural or physical delay (equal to τk
AB
in the absence of an adversary) and τk
ABM
≥ 0 is the adversarial
delay. In this case, if
|τk
AB
− τ¯k
AB
+ wk
AB
| = |τk
ABN
− τ¯k
AB
+ τk
ABM
+ wk
AB
| ≥ L (9)
then clock synchronization is compromised.
D. Vulnerability of One-Way Clock Synchronization
One-way clock synchronization is fundamentally vulnerable
to a delay attack because it provides no mechanism to mea-
sure RTT. The adversary M can compromise any one-way
wireless clock synchronization protocol by retransmitting the
authentic sync signal from A such that the retransmitted signal,
sM, overpowers or otherwise supersedes the authentic signal
sA. In the absence of additional assumptions beyond those
underpinning the one-way protocol described earlier, M can
introduce an arbitrary delay τk
ABM
in its retransmission, thereby
compromising the synchronization process.
Note that whereas counterfeit signal attacks can be pre-
vented by authentication and cryptographic methods [24],
these techniques do not prevent delay attacks because the
delayed or repeated signal has the same cryptographic charac-
teristics as that of the genuine signal, the only difference being
that it is received with a (possibly small) additional delay.
The delay introduced by M is added to the natural delay,
τk
ABN
, of the signal between A and B. As a result, an error of
≈ τk
ABM
is introduced in the estimated time offset at B. From
(4), it follows that
∆tˆk
AB
= tAk
A
+ τ¯k
AB
− zk
B
= tAk
A
+ τ¯k
AB
− (tAk
A
+ τk
AB
−∆tk
AB
+ wk
AB
)
= (τ¯k
AB
− τk
ABN
)− τk
ABM
+∆tk
AB
− wk
AB
≈ ∆tk
AB
− τk
ABM
(10)
where it is assumed that the error due to inaccurately modeled
delay is negligible and that σǫ ≪ τ
k
ABM
. In the absence of an
RTT measurement, and without further assumptions on the
nature of the protocol or the clock drift model considered, the
adversarial delay τABM is indistinguishable from a clock offset
of the same magnitude.
To be sure, measures can be taken to make a MITM delay
attack harder to execute without detection. But, importantly,
these measures cannot guarantee that the synchronization will
remain uncompromised. Various measures proposed in the
literature, and their shortcomings, are discussed below.
a) Received Signal Strength Monitoring: The adversary
M might attempt to overpower the authentic signal in order
to spoof the sync message, leading to an increase in the
total signal power received at B. Station B could monitor the
received signal strength (RSS) to detect such an attack [25].
However, a potent adversary could transmit, in addition to its
delayed signal, an amplitude-matched, phase-inverted nulling
signal that annihilates the authentic sync signal sA as received
at B, thus preventing an unusual increase in received power at
B. If M is positioned along the straight-line path between A
and B, nulling of sA can be effected without prior knowledge
of sA. A laboratory demonstration of such nulling is reported
in [26].
b) Selective Rejection of False Signal: If B receives both
the authentic and false (delayed) sync signals, it may be
able to apply angle-of-arrival or signal processing techniques
to selectively reject the delayed signal [8], [9], [27], [28].
However, discrimination based on angle-of-arrival fails if M
is positioned along the line from A to B, and, as conceded in
[9], signal-processing-based techniques for selective rejection
of false signals can be thwarted by an adversary transmitting
an additional nulling signal, as described above.
c) Collaborative Verification: Multiple time seekers may
attempt to synchronize to the same time master. In this
scenario, the time seekers can potentially detect malicious
activity by cross-checking the received signals [16]. In the
simplest implementation, all time seekers can collaborate to
verify that they are synchronized amongst each other. In case
of an uncoordinated attack against a subset of time seekers,
this verification would expose the attack since the time offset
computed at the attacked subset would be different from that
computed at the other stations. In principle, however, it is
possible for an adversary to execute a coordinated attack
against all the time seekers, thus concealing its presence.
IV. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR SECURE
SYNCHRONIZATION
This section presents a set of conditions for secure two-
way clock synchronization and proves these to be necessary
by contradiction. In other words, it is shown that if a two-
way clock synchronization protocol does not satisfy any one
of these proposed conditions, there exists an attack that can
compromise clock synchronization without detection.
It is important to note that the ability to measure RTT in a
two-way protocol is necessary, but not sufficient, for provably
secure synchronization. As an example, IEEE 1588 PTP is a
two-way protocol that has been proposed as an alternative to
GNSS for sub-microsecond clock synchronization in critical
infrastructure such as the PMU network. But, despite the bi-
directional exchange between stations, and hence the ability to
measure RTT, recent work has shown that PTP is vulnerable to
delay attacks in which a MITM introduces asymmetric delay
between A and B. Asymmetric delay breaks the assumption
that τk
AB
= τk
BA
and leads to an erroneous prior for τ¯AB and
τ¯BA for future exchanges. This vulnerability is documented
in both the literature [11], [13], [18] and the IEEE 1588-
2008 standard. Thus, a secure two-way clock synchronization
protocol must satisfy additional security requirements beyond
the ability to measure RTT.
The conditions introduced below are not tied to any spe-
cific protocol, unlike some measures proposed in the current
literature [11]–[17]. They are generally applicable to any two-
way protocol (e.g., PTP) for which the foregoing two-way
synchronization model applies.
Assuming the time master A initiates the two-way commu-
nication, the necessary conditions for secure clock synchro-
nization are as follows:
1) Both A and B must transmit unpredictable waveforms
to prevent the adversary M from generating counterfeit
signals that pass authentication. In practice, this implies
the use of a cryptographic construct such as a message
authentication code (MAC) or a digital signature.
2) The propagation time of the signal must be irreducible
to within the alert limit L along both signal paths. For
wireless clock synchronization, this condition implies
synchronization via LOS electromagnetic signals as L→
0.
3) The RTT between A and B must be known to A and
measurable by A to within the alert limit L. The RTT must
include the delays internal to both A and B, in addition
to the propagation delay. Station A must know of any
intentional delay introduced by B, such as the layover
time τBB introduced earlier.
A. Proof of Necessity of Conditions
1) Stations A and B must transmit unpredictable signals:
To prove this condition is necessary, two scenarios are con-
sidered: a) station A transmits a signal waveform sA that is
predictable, and, b) station B transmits a signal waveform sB
that is predictable.
a) sA is predictable: M can compromise synchroniza-
tion without detection as follows:
i) M takes up a position between A and B along the line
joining the antennas at the two stations.
ii) M initially transmits a replica of sA such that B receives
identical signals from both A and M. Subsequently, M
increases its signal power or otherwise supersedes sA
(e.g., via signal nulling, as discussed earlier) such that
B tracks sM, the signal transmitted by M. (Hereafter,
whenever signals fromM compete with those from A or
B, it will be assumed that those from M exert control.)
iii) Exploiting the predictability of sA,M advances its replica
sM with respect to sA by |τ
k
ABM
|, where τk
ABM
< 0. B
tracks the advanced signal, resulting in an error of τk
ABM
in the computed ∆tˆk
AB
as shown in (10).
iv) B transmits the unpredictable response sB compliant with
the prearranged layover time τ¯BB.M intercepts this signal
from B, and replays it to A with a delay of τ l
BAM
=
−τk
ABM
> 0, causing A to track the delayed signal. As
a result, the RTT is τk
AB
+ τBB + τ
l
BA
as A expects. In
summary:
τk
AB
= τk
ABN
+ τk
ABM
τ l
BA
= τ l
BAN
+ τ l
BAM
= τ l
BAN
− τk
ABM
⇒ τk
AB
+ τ l
BA
= τk
ABN
+ τ l
BAN
Thus,M undoes the effect of its sync advance, preventing
A from detecting the attack.
b) sB is predictable: M can compromise synchroniza-
tion without detection by replicating B’s behavior:
i) M takes up a position between A and B along the line
joining the antennas at the two stations.
ii) M receives the sync signal and generates a valid response
with a delay
τ¯BB +
‖xM − xB‖
‖xA − xB‖
(
τ¯k
AB
+ τ¯ l
BA
)
(11)
such that the RTT is τ¯k
AB
+ τ¯BB + τ¯
l
BA
, as A expects.
iii) M records the unpredictable signal from A and replays
it to B with an arbitrary delay τk
ABM
> 0. This results in
an error of approximately τk
ABM
in the computed ∆tˆk
AB
at
B, as shown in (10).
2) Propagation time must be irreducible to within L: If
there exists a channel that reduces the propagation time from
A to B or from B to A by more than L as compared to the
channel used by A and B, then M can compromise synchro-
nization without detection. The following attack assumes the
propagation time from A to B is reducible by more than L; a
similar attack exploits the situation in which the propagation
time from B to A is reducible by more than L.
i) M records the sync signal sA going from A to B.
ii) M makes the recorded signal reach B advanced by |τk
ABM
|
compared to sA, where τ
k
ABM
< −L. An error of τk
ABM
is introduced in the time offset value computed at B as
shown in (10).
iii) M records the response signal sB, which has the expected
prearranged layover time τBB ≈ τ¯BB.M replays this signal
to A with a delay of τ l
BAM
= −τk
ABM
such that the RTT
is consistent with what A expects.
3) RTT known to and measurable by A to within L:
Synchronization can be compromised without detection if
|zkl
RTT
− τ¯kl
RTT
| > L with non-negligible probability even in
the absence of an adversary. This condition can be met if a)
the prior estimates τ¯k
AB
, τ¯ l
BA
, or τ¯BB are not accurate to the
corresponding true values to within L, or b) the magnitude of
the measurement error sum |wk
AB
+wl
BA
| is larger than L. Note
that the condition |wk
AB
| > L compromises synchronization
even absent an adversary. An adversary M can exploit the
condition |zkl
RTT
− τ¯kl
RTT
| > L as follows:
i) M initially transmits a replica of sA such that B receives
identical signals from both A and M. Subsequently, M
introduces a delay τk
ABM
> 0 in the replayed signal sM.
As assumed earlier, sM exerts control and introduces an
error of approximately τk
ABM
in the computed ∆tˆk
AB
at B,
as shown in (10).
ii) Station B transmits the response signal with the prear-
ranged layover time τBB ≈ τ¯BB with respect to the delayed
signal.
iii) In the received signal rA, A identifies the expected feature
l(k). The RTT, if measurable, includes the delay τk
ABM
introduced by M.
iv) However, A is unable to definitively declare an attack,
since the errors in the modeled RTT and/or the measure-
ment of RTT are possibly larger than L. In other words,
it is not possible to claim that |zkl
RTT
− τ¯kl
RTT
| > L only
in the presence of adversarial delay.
V. PROOF OF SUFFICIENCY
This section presents a sufficiency proof for the set of secu-
rity conditions proposed in the previous section. A sufficiency
proof guarantees secure synchronization under the considered
system and attack models. This paper draws inspiration from
the literature on modern cryptography and formalizes the prob-
lem of secure clock synchronization with explicit definitions,
assumptions, and proofs.
A. Assumptions
This proof assumes that the system under consideration
strictly complies with the set of necessary security conditions.
Specifically,
1) Both A and B use an authenticated encryption scheme
to generate unpredictable and verifiably authentic signals
in the presence of a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversary.
2) The difference between the RTT along the communica-
tion channel between A and B and the shortest possible
RTT is negligible as compared to L.
3) The difference between the modeled delays τ¯k
AB
and τ¯ l
BA
and the true delays τk
AB
and τ l
BA
, respectively, is negligible
as compared to L.
|τ¯k
AB
− τk
ABN
| ≪ L (12)
and
|τ¯ l
BA
− τ l
BAN
| ≪ L (13)
Furthermore, A and B agree upon a fixed layover time
τ¯BB, and the difference between this and the true layover
time is negligible: |τBB − τ¯BB| ≪ L.
4) The standard deviation of the noise corrupting the mea-
surements tAk
B
and tBl
A
is negligible compared to the alert
limit:
σǫ ≪ L (14)
Notice that the above assumptions are the same as the neces-
sary conditions in Section IV, but with stricter upper bounds
on the conditions.
If symmetric keys are exchanged prior to synchronization,
then private-key cryptographic schemes such as Encrypt-then-
MAC [29] can be used for authenticated encryption. Alterna-
tively, if the keys must be exchanged over a public channel,
then digital signatures [30] can be used to authenticate the
encrypted messages. Cryptographic authentication schemes
like MAC and digital signatures generate a tag associated
with a message. Qualitatively, a MAC or digital signature
scheme is secure if a PPT adversary, even when given access
to multiple valid message-tag pairs of its own choice (as many
as possible in polynomial time), cannot generate a valid tag
for a new message with non-negligible probability. Irrespective
of the cryptographic scheme used, this proof assumes that the
probability of M generating a new valid sync or response
signal is a negligible function of the key length n:
P [Valid] < negl(n) (15)
To detect an attack before the synchronization error exceeds L,
A must select a threshold lower than L beyond which an attack
is declared. Consider the modeled RTT, τ¯kl
RTT
, as defined in
(7), and the measurement zkl
RTT
as defined in (6). A threshold
less than L, say L − δ with 0 < δ < L, is set by station A
such that if |zkl
RTT
− τ¯kl
RTT
| > L−δ, then an attack is declared.
B. Definitions
Definition V.1. A PPT adversary M succeeds if clock syn-
chronization is compromised (Definition III.1) and
|zkl
RTT
− τ¯kl
RTT
| ≤ L− δ
Definition V.2. Faster-than-light (superluminal) propagation
is defined to be hard ifM cannot propagate a signal at a speed
higher than the speed of light with non-negligible probability.
Under hardness of superluminal propagation
P[Superluminal] ≈ 0
Definition V.3. A clock synchronization protocol is defined to
be secure if, under the hardness of superluminal propagation
assumption,
P[Success] < negl(n)
where Success for M is defined in Definition V.1.
C. Proof
In the presence of an adversaryM, the measurement zkl
RTT
is modeled as
zklRTT = τ
k
ABN
+ τk
ABM
+ τ l
BAN
+ τ l
BAM
+ τBB + w
l
BA
(16)
Let τ˜k
ABN
and τ˜ l
BAN
denote the error in the modeled signal
delay due to natural/physical phenomenon. Also, let τ˜B be
the difference between the intended layover time τ¯BB and the
actual layover time τBB. Note that these might be positive or
negative.
τ˜k
ABN
= τk
ABN
− τ¯k
AB
(17)
τ˜ l
BAN
= τ l
BAN
− τ¯ l
BA
(18)
τ˜BB = τBB − τ¯BB (19)
From (7), (16), (17), (18), and (19) it follows that
zkl
RTT
= τ¯kl
RTT
+ τ˜k
ABN
+ τk
ABM
+ τ˜ l
BAN
+ τ l
BAM
+ τ˜BB + w
l
BA
Following the assumptions in (12) and (13), the residual delays
are negligible in comparison to L:
|τ˜k
ABN
| ≪ L (20)
|τ˜ l
BAN
| ≪ L (21)
This assumption is reasonable since otherwise the system
could not confidently meet the accuracy requirements even in
the absence of an adversary. Also, if τ¯BB is a short time interval
and the measurement noise σǫ is benign, it is reasonable to
assume that
|τ˜BB| ≪ L (22)
Note thatM can advance the signal by (a) forging a valid mes-
sage/tag pair, or (b) propagating the signal faster-than-light.
The assumptions of secure MAC and hardness of superluminal
propagation enforce that
P[τk
ABM
< 0] < P[Valid] + P[Superluminal]
≈ negl(n)
In order to stay undetected, the adversary must ensure
L− δ ≥ |zkl
RTT
− τ¯kl
RTT
|
= |τ˜k
ABN
+ τk
ABM
+ τ˜ l
BAN
+ τ l
BAM
+ τ˜BB + w
l
BA
| (23)
At the same time, in order to compromise time transfer, from
(9), M must ensure
L ≤ |τ˜k
ABN
+ τk
ABM
+ wk
AB
|
≤ |τ˜k
ABN
+ wk
AB
|+ |τk
ABM
|
⇒ |τk
ABM
| ≥ L− |τ˜k
ABN
+ wk
AB
| (24)
The probability of success for M is evaluated as
P[Success] = P[(Success) ∩ (τk
ABM
< 0)]+
P[(Success) ∩ (τk
ABM
≥ 0)]
= P[(Success)|(τk
ABM
< 0)]P[τk
ABM
< 0]+
P[(Success) ∩ (τk
ABM
≥ 0)]
≤ P[τk
ABM
< 0] + P[(Success) ∩ (τk
ABM
≥ 0)]
< negl(n) + P[(Success) ∩ (τk
ABM
≥ 0)] (25)
In the case where τABM ≥ 0, (24) simplifies to
τk
ABM
≥ L− |τ˜k
ABN
+ wk
AB
|
Substituting the least possible value of τk
ABM
into (23), it
follows that
|τ˜k
ABN
+L−|τ˜k
ABN
+wk
AB
|+ τ˜ l
BAN
+τ l
BAM
+ τ˜BB+w
l
BA
| ≤ L−δ
Notice that from the assumptions made in (14), (20), (21), and
(22), all terms except L and τ l
BAM
on the left-hand side of the
inequality are negligible compared to L; thus,
|L+ τ l
BAM
| ≤ L− δ
Since both L and L− δ are defined to be positive, the above
inequality simplifies to
τ l
BAM
≤ −δ
where δ > 0. Thus, for M to succeed in the case where
τk
ABM
≥ 0, we must have that τ l
BAM
< 0. As a result
P[(Success) ∩ (τk
ABM
≥ 0)] < negl(n)
Thus, from (25)
P[Success] < negl(n)
Qualitatively, the proof presented here argues that for the
adversary to succeed, it needs to either advance the sync signal
(τABM < 0), or advance the response signal (τBAM < 0). With
the use of a secure MAC (or digital signature) and the hardness
of superluminal propagation, the adversary can only succeed
with a negligible probability.
VI. SECURE CONSTRUCTIONS
This section specializes the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for secure clock synchronization to IEEE 1588 PTP.
In addition, it presents an alternative to PTP for wireless
synchronization—a compliant synchronization system with
GNSS-like signals.
A. Secure IEEE 1588 PTP
The necessary and sufficient conditions for secure synchro-
nization, as adapted to IEEE 1588 PTP, are as follows:
1) Stations A and B must use an authenticated encryption
scheme to preventM from generating valid message/tag
pairs.
2) The difference between the path delays between A and B
and the shortest possible path delays must be negligible
as compared to L. For wireless PTP [31], [32], this
implies communicating over the LOS channel as L→ 0.
For traditional wireline PTP, A and B must attempt to
communicate over the (nearly) shortest possible path.
3) The path delay, which is usually estimated from the RTT
measurements, must be accurately known a priori for
secure synchronization. The RTT measurements must be
verified against the expected RTT. This implies that the
layover time τ¯BB must also be known to A.
Note that in the usual PTP formulation, the path delay is
measured and used by the time seeker B. To this end, in
the usual formulation A sends the transmit time of the sync
message and the receipt time of the delay req message (in
PTP parlance). Similar conventions may be accommodated in
the system model presented in this paper, wherein A sends the
values of tAk
A
, zl
A
, and τ¯kl
RTT
to B, and the following calculations
may be performed and used at B. However, this would only be
a cosmetic change and does not affect the arguments in this
paper.
The first security condition has already been proposed in
the IEEE 1588-2008 standard. The second condition, however,
has not been considered in any of the earlier works in
the literature. Following the depiction of sync and response
signal exchange in Fig. 2 and the attack strategy outlined in
Section IV-A2, Fig. 3 illustrates an example attack against a
PTP implementation that does not satisfy the second necessary
condition. Notice that the existence of a shorter time path
enablesM to advance the sync signal relative to the authentic
message from A. Subsequently,M is able to undo the effect of
the advance on the RTT by delaying the response signal from
B to A. Station A does not measure any abnormality in the RTT,
and thus cannot raise an alarm. Meanwhile, synchronization
has been compromised at B.
Fig. 3. Illustration of an example attack against a PTP implementation that
violates the second necessary condition.
The third condition is similar to the proposal in [11] of
measuring the path delays during initialization and monitoring
the delays during normal operation. However, [11] requires
that B respond to A with zero delay during initialization to
enable measurement of the reference delays. This condition
is sufficient, but not necessary for secure synchronization.
The system is in fact secure even if B is allowed a fixed
layover time. Fig. 4 illustrates an example attack against a PTP
implementation in violation of the third necessary condition.
Note that the uncertainty of the a priori estimate of the
RTT (σ¯RTT) is larger than the alert limit, violating the third
necessary condition which requires that the expected RTT be
known to within the alert limit (and with much higher accuracy
for provable sufficiency). Even though the measured RTT in
this case is inconsistent with the expected RTT, it cannot be
definitively flagged as an attack since benign variations in the
RTT may also have led to the observed RTT.
Fig. 4. Illustration of an example attack against a PTP implementation that
violates the third necessary condition.
Interestingly, at first sight, the third security condition in
this paper does not resemble the proposed defense in [18] that
enforces an upper bound on the synchronization error accu-
mulated between sync messages and recommends that B send
its timestamps to A periodically for verification. As explained
next, this condition is in fact equivalent to the condition of
known and measurable RTT, when adapted according to the
system model considered in [18].
Note that the requirement of a zero delay in [11], or a short
layover time in this paper, enables A to measure the RTT since
the transmit time of the lth feature in sB, that is t
Bl
B
, can be
approximately traced back to A’s clock to within the alert limit
as tAk
A
+τ¯k
AB
+τ¯BB. Enforcing the synchronization error to within
L and transmitting B’s timestamp to A achieves the same
objective for the defense in [18], since the transmit time from B
can be traced back to A’s clock with the assumed approximate
synchronization. Therefore, the proposed countermeasures in
[11] and [18] are two different incarnations of the third
security condition proposed in this paper. Of course, the failure
of both [11] and [18] to address the second necessary condition
makes their proposed defenses vulnerable to an adversary that
can communicate along a shorter time path between A and B.
B. Alternative Compliant System
This section describes an alternative wireless clock synchro-
nization protocol that satisfies the set of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions presented in Section IV. The proposed pro-
tocol involves bi-directional exchange of GNSS-like pseudo-
random codes for continuous clock synchronization, in con-
trast to discrete packet-based synchronization techniques such
as NTP and PTP. It is offered here to illustrate the general
applicability of the proposed necessary and sufficient con-
ditions to a range of underlying protocols. Such a protocol
can potentially be applied in two-way satellite time transfer
and terrestrial wireless clock synchronization systems for
continuous clock synchronization, in contrast to the packet-
based discrete synchronization in NTP/PTP.
The time master A and the time seeker B communicate
wirelessly over the LOS channel between the nodes. To
simplify the analysis, it is assumed that A and B securely share
long sequences of pseudo-random bits prior to synchroniza-
tion. These sequences of bits will later enable generation of
unpredictable signals. The pseudo-random sequence for A has
the form
bA =
{
bk
A
}N
k=0
, bk
A
∈ {0, 1}
The pseudo-random code CA(tA) for A is then generated as
CA(tA) = 2b
k
A
− 1 for tA ∈ [t
Ak
A
, t
Ak+1
A
), k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}
where tAk
A
denotes the time according to A at which the start
of the kth bit in A’s signal is transmitted. The pseudo-random
nature of bA ensures that CA(tA) has good cross-correlation
properties, which enables an accurate measurement of the
time-of-arrival of A’s signal at B, that is, σǫ ≪ L. Station
A modulates a carrier with the code CA and transmits a signal
sA(tA) whose complex baseband representation is given as
sA(tA) = CA(tA) exp (jθA(tA))
This signal is received at B as
rB(tA, τAB) = sA(tA − τAB) + wAB(tA)
= CA(tA − τAB) exp (jθA(tA − τAB)) + wAB(tA)
where all symbols have their usual meanings as detailed
in Section III. Station B captures a window Rk
B
of rB and
correlates it with a local replica of CA. The result of the
correlation enables B to detect the start of the kth bit of CA
in the window, and provides a measurement
zk
B
= tAk
B
+ wk
AB
of the time-of-arrival of the kth bit at B. Furthermore, the
relationship between the start of the kth bit and tAk
A
enables B
to infer the latter.
If a prior estimate τ¯k
AB
of τk
AB
is available, then B estimates
the clock offset ∆tk
AB
as in (4).
Similar to the pseudo-random sequence and code construc-
tion for A, B generates its unpredictable code CB(tB). A and B
agree on a one-to-one mapping between CA and CB such that
B responds with the lth bit of CB on reception of the start of
the kth bit of CA. Furthermore, A and B agree that the start
of the lth bit of CB will have a code-phase offset of τ¯BB with
respect to the start of the kth bit of CA. Station B transmits
the response signal as
sB(tB) = CB(tB) exp (jθB(tB))
such that
tBl
B
= zk
B
+ τ¯BB
according to the time at B. In true time, the epoch tBl
B
corresponds to
tBl
B
⇋ tAk
A
+ τk
AB
+ wk
AB
+ τBB
Station A receives the response as
rA = sB(tB − τBA) + wBA(tA)
and captures a window of the signal Rl
A
. A correlates Rl
A
with
a local replica of CB to detect the start of the lth bit of CB.
This enables A to measure the time-of-arrival
zl
A
= tBl
A
+ wl
BA
Moreover, the detection of the lth bit indicates that it was
transmitted in response to the receipt of the start of the kth
bit of CA. Since A knows the start time of the kth bit as t
Ak
A
,
it measures the RTT as described in (6).
Note that the exchange of one-time pad sequences enables
the proposed system to satisfy the first security condition.
Wireless LOS communication satisfies the second security
condition, and the knowledge of the code-phase layover offset
enables A to make an accurate prior estimate of the RTT within
the alert limit, thereby satisfying the third security condition.
Thus, the proposed system complies with all three necessary
and sufficient conditions for secure clock synchronization.
VII. SYSTEM SIMULATION
This section presents a simulation study of a secure clock
synchronization model operating over a simplistic channel
model. Unlike the abstract treatment of delays in the security
derivations presented earlier, the simulation is carried out
with models of delays experienced by the synchronization
messages over a real channel. This study also expounds
the interplay between slave clock stability, security require-
ments, attack models, and attack detection thresholds that
must be determined in a practical synchronization system.
The channel and attack models developed in this simulation
are not comprehensive. Rather, relatively simple models are
considered to clearly demonstrate the underlying principles.
More sophisticated channel and attack models can similarly
be analyzed by following the outline of this simulation.
A. Channel Model
The simulated system resembles a traditional local area
network, and is schematically depicted in Fig. 5. As before, A
and B are the time master and seeker stations, respectively. The
messages between these stations pass through a series of N
routers. Each router is under network traffic loading generated
by the nodes labeled T. The routers perform simple packet for-
warding, i.e., no cryptographic operations or complex payload
modifications are performed. Each router transmits the queued
packets at a service rate of 1 Gbps. Each network packet is
assumed to have a size of 1542 bytes. The MITM adversary
M maliciously inserts itself along the communication path
between A and B.
Fig. 5. Schematic diagram of the network topology considered in this section.
The sync and response packets from A and B experience
processing and queueing delay at each router, and prop-
agation/link delay between routers. Queueing delay is the
duration for which the packet is buffered in the router before
it can be transmitted. Processing delay is the time taken
by the router to process the packet header, for example, to
determine the packet’s destination. Since the routers in this
simulation perform simple packet forwarding, the processing
delay is negligible as compared to the queueing delay [33]. The
propagation/link delay is also insignificant for local networks
because the propagation speed is a comparable fraction of the
speed of light. Thus, only the queueing delay significantly
contributes to the overall channel delay variations.
Let the network idle probability for a particular router,
denoted by ρ, be defined as the probability of the router queue
being empty at a randomly chosen time instant. Since the
synchronization packets are delay-sensitive, the routers in this
simulation implement non-preemptive priority scheduling for
synchronization packets when the queue is not empty. This
means that on arrival of a sync or response packet, the router
is allowed to complete the transmission of the data packet
currently being serviced, if any, but is required to service
the delay-sensitive packet before the other network data in
the queue. Since the time period between consecutive sync-
response pairs is quite large as compared to the RTT for a
given pair, it is assumed that a router never has more than one
delay-sensitive packet in its queue. Under such scheduling, the
delay experienced by the timing messages is best modeled as
follows: with probability ρ, the total router delay is zero, and
with probability (1 − ρ) the total router delay is uniformly
distributed between zero and the maximum time to service
a packet of length 1542 bytes (1542 × 8 × 2−30 ≈ 11.49
microseconds for a Gigabit router).
Given the above channel specifications and values for N
and ρ, it is possible to perform a Monte Carlo simulation to
obtain the anticipated RTT τ¯RTT, which is taken to be the
empirical mean of the RTT measurements in the simulation,
and the associated standard deviation σ¯RTT. As shown in
Fig. 6, in case of a single sync-response pair measurement,
the RTT has an empirical mean of 80.34 microseconds and
an empirical standard deviation of 17.09 microseconds with
N = 10 and ρ = 0.3. Observe that even for a relatively small
N , the empirical distribution approaches the Gaussian shape,
but has slightly heavier tail on the higher end of the delay.
The distribution for mean of batches of 10 observations has a
smaller empirical standard deviation of 5.41 microseconds.
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Fig. 6. Empirical distribution of the RTT of sync-response pairs through
a network of N = 10 routers with network idle probability of ρ = 0.3.
The light-shaded histogram shows the empirical distribution of the RTT of a
single sync-response pair. The dark-shaded histogram shows the corresponding
distribution for the mean of batches of 10 observations of the RTT.
B. System and Security Requirements
The clock at the time seeker B drifts with respect to the true
time clock at A unless corrected by a sync message from A. As
before, let L denote the alert limit for the system. Let T denote
a time duration over which a perfectly synchronized clock at
B at the beginning of the duration, absent an adversary, drifts
more than LN for some LN < L with a probability smaller
than an acceptably small bound Pǫ.
In the system under simulation, the clock offset for B is
estimated and corrected for every T seconds. By definition
of T , it holds that if the clocks at A and B are perfectly
synchronized after every T seconds, then the natural drift
envelope of B’s clock does not exceed L with an unacceptably
high probability. Define
LM , L− LN
Observe that if an adversary is able to introduce a synchro-
nization error larger than LM, then the system is compromised
since the natural drift of the clock at B could potentially lead
to a clock offset greater than L before the next synchronization
interval, with a probability greater than Pǫ. Thus, A must flag
any adversarial delay greater than L − LN with probability
higher than a desired detection probability, denoted by PD. It is
worth noting that this practical complication of the magnitude
of LN was abstracted in the sufficiency proof, where the
threshold was set to L− δ for δ > 0.
In general, A makes multiple measurements of the RTT
between A and B over the time period T . As shown in Fig. 6,
the mean of multiple observations over T has a distribution
with a smaller standard deviation as compared to that of
a single observation. In the simulated system, if no attack
is detected, A updates τ¯k
AB
every T seconds based on the
empirical mean of the RTT measurements made over that
period. Note that even though τ¯k
AB
is updated based on the
measurements, no updates are applied to τ¯RTT and σ¯RTT,
which are predetermined by simulation or measurements under
a secure calibration campaign.
The empirical mean of the measured RTT is taken as the
test statistic to detect an attack. For the attack model detailed
next, it can be shown that this test statistic becomes optimal
for large values of N [34].
C. Attack Model
The synchronization system considered in this simulation
complies with the necessary security conditions presented
in this paper. Consequently, the adversary M is unable to
advance the sync or response messages, and can only increase
the RTT measured by A relative to the authentic RTT. This
simulation considers a simple adversary model that introduces
a fixed delay in the measured RTT. In order to conceal its
presence while compromising synchronization with apprecia-
ble probability,M introduces a delay of LM+ ξ seconds for
some small ξ > 0.
Let H0 denote the null hypothesis (no attack), and H1
denote the alternative hypothesis. Under H0, the measured
RTT at A is drawn from the distribution that was used to
calibrate/simulate the channel delay distribution, while under
H1, the measured RTT is drawn from a distribution that is
shifted from the calibration distribution by LM + ξ. This is
visually depicted in Fig. 7. Given a detection threshold λ,
the dark-shaded region in Fig. 7 denotes the probability of
false alarm, PF, while the light-shaded region denotes the
probability of missed detection (1−PD). In observing Fig. 7, it
might be argued, and holds true, that a reasonable attacker may
introduce noise in the introduced delay to inflate the width of
the distribution under H1 and thereby decrease the probability
of detection of an attack. However, in that case, the empirical
mean test statistic is no longer optimal. Instead, A would
incorporate the observed variance of the RTT in its test statistic
in addition to the empirical mean. In short, the attack model in
this simulation is not comprehensive, as explained previously.
For a more sophisticated treatment of sensor deception and
protection techniques, the reader may refer to [35].
Fig. 7. Representation of the distributions under H0 and H1 along with the
detection threshold and the associated PF and PD.
D. Simulation
The system and attack described above have been simulated
with N = 10 and ρ = 0.3 for all routers. The adversarial
delay LM + ξ is set to 10 microseconds, and the required
probability of detection PD is set to 0.999. The number of
RTT observations made in time T are varied between 1 and
200. Given the number of observations, and a required PD, the
system is simulated under H1 for 10
6 detection epochs and
the maximum possible detection threshold λ that satisfies the
detection probability is obtained. Subsequently, the system is
simulated underH0 and the number of test statistics exceeding
the threshold λ are recorded. The frequency of such epochs is
reported as the probability of false alarm PF.
Fig. 8 shows the above procedure for 80 RTT measurements
made per test statistic. In this case, λ is obtained to be 84.53
microseconds and the corresponding PF is 1.59%. Fig. 9
shows a log-log plot of PF as a function of the number
of observations made per test statistic. When the number of
observations is greater than 160, no false alarms were observed
with 106 trials. For the given channel delay variation statistics,
the probability of false alarm is very high for small number
of observations per decision epoch since the threshold λ that
must be set to detect an attack with the required PD is large
in comparison to the minimal delay that the adversary must
introduce to compromise synchronization (LM). For a more
stable channel, such as a wireless or PTP-aware channel, fewer
measurements per decision epoch would suffice.
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Fig. 8. Distribution of the test statistic under H0 and H1 for 80 RTT
measurements per decision epoch. (N = 10, ρ = 0.3, LM + ξ = 10µs,
PD = 0.999)
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Fig. 9. Probability of false alarm as a function of number of observations
per decision epoch. (N = 10, ρ = 0.3, LM + ξ = 10µs, PD = 0.999)
E. Practical Implications
Section V-A makes fairly remarkable assumptions about
the synchronization system to show provably secure time
transfer. For instance, it requires that errors in the a priori
estimate of the RTT of the timing messages be negligible
compared to the alert limit. Nonetheless, as shown in this
section, for a given channel with bounded delay variations and
a given slave clock, some level of security guarantee can be
made for a synchronization system that satisfies the necessary
and sufficient conditions presented herein. For concreteness,
consider a system that requires an alert limit of L = 100
microseconds and a slave clock that drifts no more than
LN = 50 microseconds over a period of T = 1 second with
acceptably high probability (1 − Pǫ). Then, for N = 10 and
ρ = 0.3, if A makes 10 RTT measurements over 1 second,
the empirical mean test statistic is distributed as the dark-
shaded distribution in Fig. 6 with a standard deviation of ≈ 5.4
microseconds. For LM = L − LN = 50 microseconds, a
threshold of ≈ τ¯RTT + 30 microseconds will yield a missed
detection rate of approximately 1 in 15000, and a false alarm
rate of approximately 3.5 in 1 million. With a more stable slave
clock or more measurements per second, these probabilities
can be made more favorable.
Another important concern that has not been addressed in
the simulation is that of the incorporation of cryptographic
constructs in the synchronization protocol. The encryption
and decryption algorithms are often complex and take non-
negligible processing time to execute. However, note that at A,
the sync message is timestamped after the encryption process,
and thus the time taken for encryption is inconsequential. At
B, it is important to concede that the decryption of the sync
message and the encryption of the response message cannot be
assumed to happen instantaneously. This has been accounted
for by allowing the layover time τ¯BB for the cryptographic
processes to execute. Once again, the receipt timestamp of
the response message at A is applied before the decryption
process, and hence the decryption time at A is inconsequential.
Thus, compliance with the first security condition must not
pose significant practical challenges.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
A fundamental theory of secure clock synchronization was
developed for a generic system model. The problem of secure
clock synchronization was formalized with explicit assump-
tions, models, and definitions. It was shown that all possible
one-way clock synchronization protocols are vulnerable to re-
play attacks. A set of necessary conditions for secure two-way
clock synchronization was proposed and proved. Compliance
with these necessary conditions with strict upper bounds was
shown to be sufficient for secure clock synchronization, which
is a significant result for provable security in critical infrastruc-
ture. The general applicability of the set of security conditions
was demonstrated by specializing these conditions to design a
secure PTP protocol and an alternative secure two-way clock
synchronization protocol with GNSS-like signals. Results from
a simulation with models of channel delays were presented to
expound the interplay between slave clock stability, security
requirements, attack models, and attack detection thresholds.
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